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PART II. COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

1. What is Meant by the Coordination of Requirements?

Judgments on the following questions are required before requirements for field collection can be said to be adequately coordinated at headquarters. Many who are concerned with this subject frequently forget or overlook the fact that the eventual responsibility for making these judgments falls not upon researchers but upon middlemen known as "requirements officers" in research offices or upon those associated directly with the managers of the collection facilities.

(a) Can the Answer to the Requirements be Found in Washington? In general, "requirements officers" press researchers with regard to whether this material has already been placed in finished intelligence and the more competent analysts are fully aware of the existing literature, both unclassified and classified. However, it is the "requirements officers," either directly attached to research offices or a central facility such as OCD in CIA, who are trained to query the availability of the material in Washington and whose knowledge and experience in locating materials provides some expertise in this regard. It can also be said that in the last several years there has been an increased effort to construct bibliographies of materials such as, for example, the monthly accessions list of Soviet publications put out by the Library of Congress under contract with CIA as well as increased efforts to exploit systematically such literature through the use of FDD and certain external contract arrangements.

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(b) Has a Requirement for this Information Already Been Levied? The "requirements officers" in the research offices, committees which levy requirements, the separately established offices such as CIA/OCD and finally the offices administering the collection programs should recognize a duplicating requirement. However, it should be noted that there is no mechanism to assure against duplication say, for example, of collection by attaches [REDACTED] against requirements levied by different consumers. It is true that, in theory, once information against a requirement is collected and disseminated that other similar requirements will either be dropped or not levied. CIA/OCD is planning a central register of those requirements which they handle to assure interalia against duplication of requirements.

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(c) Which Collection Facility Should Receive the Assignment? This judgment is made initially by the research analyst, his judgment being checked by the middlemen "requirements officers" and tested by the staff of the administrator of the collection facility to which it is assigned. Clandestine collection, because of its hazards and expense, is normally not undertaken until collection from overt sources fails or can be anticipated to fail and the matter is of importance. Exceptions arise where clandestine capabilities have been developed and are available [REDACTED] Planning the overall direction of clandestine collection does receive coordinated interagency guidance and reflects the priorities of National Intelligence objectives as stated in DCID 4/4.

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(d) Does the Requirement Reflect the Immediately Related Needs of Others than the Originator? In the main such correlation, if any, is a responsibility shouldered by the "requirements officers" or the staffs of the collection facility itself. Improvements in this regard have been effected as a result of advances in the coordination of research. Thus,

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requirements which take account of related needs may emerge, for example, from the Watch Committee, the EIC, the JAEIC and from the NIS program and, stated in broader form, from the IAC post mortem procedures managed by ONE. In addition, recently a statement of requirements for intelligence information for support of propaganda and psywar activities of the Government has been made (see the USIA Survey).

(e) Is the Requirement Properly Handled in Keeping With its Importance and the Capabilities of the Collection Facility to Which it has Been Assigned? This is frequently called the "priorities" problem and is one which has proved fascinating to explore theoretically. National Intelligence Objectives and Priorities (DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4) are presumed to be the most authoritative statement of intelligence matters relating to national security. (It is generally felt that matters which can be labeled as relating to national security are ipso facto more important than those requirements which are immediately responsive to departmental needs. However, "National Security" needs existed before that phrase acquired its present usage and there was a time when there was no real distinction between departmental needs and national security needs. This is still true today, at least to a great degree. While national intelligence objectives can serve a useful purpose in providing guidance in planning various collection programs three qualifications should be kept in mind with respect to judging the importance of collection requirements in the light of national intelligence objectives:

1. That a given collection facility may have relatively little capability at the time of receipt to collect on requirements directly related to national intelligence objectives;

2. That such facilities may have great capability on matters not directly related to national intelligence objectives. Those analysts

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working on subject matter which is readily identified with major national intelligence objectives thus will seek to impose the theory that such objectives should guide all collection, although when they find their own work to be related to a subordinate objective they are inclined to point out the importance of exploitation of "incidental" capabilities while major objectives are being pursued.

3. That national intelligence objectives are in the main most meaningful to the researcher. A proper translation by the researcher of those national intelligence objectives eventually into collection requirements which exclude intelligence already collected or produced is the way in which objectives are meaningful to the collector.

2. Will a Coordinated Research and Estimating Program Produce Coordinated Requirements? To a considerable extent this is true. The development of a national estimating program on an annual, semi-annual and quarterly basis has definitely affected and given direction to research work in OSI, ORR and State and to the military, even though no doubt the same subjects would have been the object of investigation even if national estimates were not produced. This is because the policy problems which require intelligence support would still be here. Again, certainly, establishment of a formal mission in an office such as ORR to appraise systematically and to coordinate the appraisal of the economic capability of the enemy to wage war, provides a base from which to develop requirements for the economic reporting of foreign service, [REDACTED] the acquisition and exploitation of foreign language publications, the investigation of materials obtained and located in other agencies

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of the Government, the interrogation of refugees and defectors, special intelligence, and others. To cite an additional illustration in the case of the NIS (which has a longer history than any other identifiable intelligence program) as sections of the NIS are completed, requirements relating to the identified gaps are levied on the field, in addition to the requirements which were levied during the preparation of the NIS. This program has provided systematic direction to a collection which, while not strictly in response to a list of national intelligence objectives, is nonetheless responsive to priority needs of the JCS.

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

TAB A